US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, June 12, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, June 12, 2026.
The global human rights system is in peril. Under relentless pressure from US President Donald Trump, and persistently undermined by China and Russia, the rules-based international order is being crushed, threatening to take with it the architecture human rights defenders have come to rely on to advance norms and protect freedoms. To defy this trend, governments that still value human rights, alongside social movements, civil society, and international institutions, need to form a strategic alliance to push back.
To be fair, the downward spiral predated Trump’s reelection. The democratic wave that began over 50 years ago has given way to what scholars term a “democratic recession.” Democracy is now back to 1985 levels according to some metrics, with 72 percent of the world’s population now living under autocracy. Russia and China are less free today than 20 years ago. And so is the United States.
Of course, democracy is not a panacea for human rights violations; the US and other longtime democracies have their own histories of colonial crimes, racism, abusive justice systems, and wartime atrocities. More recently, authoritarian leaders have exploited public mistrust and anger to win elections and then dismantled the very institutions that brought them to power. Democratic institutions are crucial to represent the will of the people and keep power in check. It’s no surprise that whenever democracy is undermined, rights are too, as evident in recent years in India, Türkiye, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Hungary.
FIRST: The Momentum Movement’s parliamentary representative David Bedo and independent member of parliament Akos Hadhazy protest against a law that bans Pride marches in Hungary and imposes fines on organizers and attendees of such events, Budapest, June 12, 2026. © 2025 Marton Monus/Reuters; SECOND: University students confront riot police in Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, June 12, 2026. © 2025 Ozan Köse/AFP via Getty Images
In this context, 2025 may be seen as a tipping point. In just 12 months, the Trump administration has carried out a broad assault on key pillars of US democracy and the global rules-based order, which the US, despite inconsistencies, was, with other states, instrumental in helping to establish.
In short order, Trump’s second-term administration has undermined trust in the sanctity of elections, reduced government accountability, gutted food assistance and healthcare subsidies, attacked judicial independence, defied court orders, rolled back women’s rights, obstructed access to abortion care, undermined remedies for racial harm, terminated programs mandating accessibility for people with disabilities, punished free speech, stripped protections from trans and intersex people, eroded privacy, and used government power to intimidate political opponents, the media, law firms, universities, civil society, and even comedians.
Claiming a risk of “civilizational erasure” in Europe and leaning on racist tropes to cast entire populations as unwelcome in the US, the Trump administration has embraced policies and rhetoric that align with white nationalist ideology. Immigrants and asylum seekers have been subjected to inhumane conditions and degrading treatment; 32 died in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody in 2025, and as of mid-January 2026, an additional 4 have died. Masked immigration enforcement agents have targeted people of color, using excessive force, terrorizing communities, wrongfully arresting scores of citizens, and, most recently, unjustifiably killing two people in Minneapolis, whose deaths Human Rights Watch has documented.
The US president of course has the authority to tighten US borders and enforce stricter immigration policies. The administration is not, however, entitled to deny legal process to asylum seekers, mistreat undocumented migrants, or unlawfully discriminate. In a well-functioning democracy, no electoral mandate should supersede domestic legislation, constitutional protections, or international human rights law. Trump’s team has repeatedly bypassed these guardrails.
The violations have not stopped at the border. The Trump administration used a 1798 law to send hundreds of Venezuelan migrants to an infamous prison in El Salvador, where they were tortured and sexually abused. Its blatantly unlawful strikes on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific extrajudicially killed more than 120 people whom Trump claims were drug traffickers.
US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, June 12, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, June 12, 2026.
After the US attacked Venezuela and apprehended its president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump claimed the US would “run” the country and control its vast oil reserves. Despite paying lip service to human rights concerns under Maduro at the United Nations, Trump has worked with the same repressive apparatus to further US interests. Many Western allies have chosen to stay silent about these lawless moves, perhaps fearing erratic tariffs and blowback to their alliances.
Trump’s foreign policy has upended the foundations of the rules-based order that seeks to advance democracy and human rights, even if imperfectly.
Trump has boasted that he doesn’t “need international law” as a constraint, only his “own morality.” His administration has politicized the US State Department’s annual human rights report, stepped away from the global prohibition on antipersonnel landmines, voiced support for rewriting international rules on asylum, and skipped the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of the US’ human rights record.
His administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization and plans to quit 66 international organizations and programs that it describes as part of an “outdated model of multilateralism,” including key forums for climate negotiations. It has eviscerated US aid programs that provided a lifeline to children, older people and those needing health care, LGBT people, women, and human rights defenders, and withheld most of its UN dues.
Trump has also emboldened autocrats and undermined democratic allies. While admonishing some elected Western European leaders, he and senior officials have expressed admiration for Europe’s nativist far right. He has favored autocrats such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, while continuing decades of US support to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
His administration has unjustifiably imposed sanctions to punish respected Palestinian human rights organizations, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor and many of its judges, a UN special rapporteur, and for several months, a Brazilian Supreme Court judge and his wife.
The institutional response in the US to Trump’s power grabs has been shockingly muted. Much of Congress, controlled by his own party, has not challenged his supercharged expansion of executive power. The leaders of the US’ most powerful technology companies have made significant donations and sought to placate the president. Some big law firms and prestigious universities have made deals rather than assert their independence, and some media organizations seem afraid to attract the president’s ire.
Has the US switched sides on the human rights playing field? While US engagement with human rights institutions has always been selective, China and Russia have long pursued an illiberal agenda. They stand much to gain from a US government that now expresses open hostility to universal rights. China and Russia remain strategic rivals of the US, but all three countries are now led by leaders who share open disdain for norms and institutions that could constrain their power.
Police detain an activist outside the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, before lawmakers approved a bill that punishes online searches for information that is deemed “extremist,” in Moscow, June 12, 2026.
Together, they wield considerable economic, military, and diplomatic power. If they were to consistently act as allies of convenience to erode global rules, they could threaten the entire system. Already, a loose international network of countries such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar, Cuba, and Belarus work in concert with Russia and China. These leaders share very little ideologically but align in undermining human rights and promoting a regressive international agenda. In word and in practice, the US government is now helping them in this endeavor.
FIRST: Surveillance cameras installed in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, June 12, 2026. © 2025 Kyodo News via Getty Images; SECOND: A television in a restaurant in Hong Kong shows a missile being launched during military exercises being held by China around the island of Taiwan, June 12, 2026. © 2022 Isaac Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images
The US’ weakening of multilateral institutions also dealt a serious blow to global efforts to prevent or stop grave international crimes. The “never again” movement, born from the horrors of the Holocaust and reignited by the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, spurred the UN General Assembly to embrace the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. Meant to guide international intervention to prevent and stop atrocities in tandem with efforts to prosecute and punish serious crimes, R2P made a real difference in places like the Central African Republic and Kenya.
Today, R2P is rarely invoked and the ICC is under siege. In addition to Trump’s far-reaching sanctions, in December 2025 a Moscow court sentenced the ICC prosecutor and eight of its judges to prison terms in absentia. Moreover, despite being ICC fugitives, in 2025, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was welcomed by Donald Trump in Alaska, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Hungary, an ICC member state at the time, at Orban’s invitation.
Twenty years ago, the US government and civil society were instrumental in galvanizing a response to mass atrocities in Darfur. Sudan is burning again, but this time under Trump, with relative impunity. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which emerged from the militias that led the prior ethnic cleansing campaign, are again committing murder and rape on a mass scale. A growing body of evidence indicates that the UAE, a longtime US ally that recently made multi-billion-dollar deals with Trump, is providing the RSF with military support.
A former bus station turned into internally displaced person settlement in Gedaref, Sudan, June 12, 2026.
In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israeli armed forces have committed acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, killing over 70,000 people since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and displacing the vast majority of Gaza’s population. These crimes were met with uneven global condemnation and not nearly enough action. Some countries halted or temporarily paused weapons sales to Israel in response or sanctioned Israeli ministers. Trump, however, continued a long-standing US policy of almost unconditional support to Israel, even as the International Court of Justice is weighing allegations of genocide and has issued binding orders under the Genocide Convention to protect Palestinians’ rights.
Trump announced in February an alarming US plan to transform Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East” free of Palestinians, which would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing. As implementation of the 20-point Trump peace plan has stalled, the administration has further normalized the dispossession of Palestinians through its failure to publicly protest Israel’s regular killing of those approaching the “yellow line” that now divides Gaza, its ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes, and unlawful restrictions on humanitarian aid.
FIRST: A Palestinian girl stands amidst rubble in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, June 12, 2026. © 2025 Bashar Taleb/AFP via Getty Images; SECOND: Palestinians inspect a house demolished by Israeli military forces in the town of Qabatiya in the Israeli occupied West Bank, June 12, 2026. © 2025 Nasser Ishtayeh/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
In Ukraine, Trump’s peace efforts have consistently downplayed Russia’s responsibility for serious violations. These include indiscriminate bombing, coercing Ukrainians in occupied areas to serve in the Russian military, systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war, the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the use of quadcopter drones to hunt and kill civilians. Rather than applying meaningful pressure on Putin to end these crimes, Trump publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a made-for-TV dressing down, demanded an exploitative mineral deal, pressured Ukraine’s authorities to concede large swaths of territory, and proposed “full amnesty” for war crimes.
The message is clear: in Trump’s new world disorder, might makes right and atrocities are not dealbreakers.
A man stands in the courtyard of his house following a Russian strike on the outskirts of Odesa, Ukraine, June 12, 2026.
ㅈ길이를 쉽게 측정하는수단 활명수병 12. 한국남성 성기 평균크기jpg 조니 소말리 인물 갤러리. 초6때 꼬털이 나기 시작했고 아직 겨털은 거의 없습니다. 정신없이 섹스하고 나중에 배아프다고 엄청 아프다고 그랬음.
전 꼬털이 나면 급성장기가 오는 줄 알았는데 거의 3년이 지났는데 조금씩은 컸지만 1년에 10cm처럼 확 크진.. 발기 시 1113센치가 한국남자 평균길이 입니다.. Com › mgallery › board13cm 좆은 a컵 같은거임 비뇨기과 마이너 갤러리.. 왼쪽을 보통 정도1213cm라고 볼 때 한국의 대물 기준16cm을 대입한다면 저렇게 길이둘레 2배 수준으로 차이가 나지 않는다..
| 중3 남자 급성장기 전문가 안녕하세요. | 235 1030 173559 대댓글 0 케바케라고. | 13위 동아시아의 일본남자 평균 페니스사이즈는 12. |
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| 조사에 따르면 발기 전의 길이나 크기는 발기 후의 최종상태와 밀접한 연관성이 없었으며 키, 체질량지수 bmi, 발크기 등 다양한 신체조건에 따른. | 05 주작아니고 풀발8센치 조금 넘는데 그냥 섹스 포기함 자존감 최하임 키는 183 넘고 예전에 야구해서 떡대도 큰데 그냥 개작음 여친 착한애들만 만났는데 섹스만족감 없었을거임 연애하기가 두렵 0. | 7cm인데, 항상 평균이라고 생각했고, 지금도 그렇게 생각해. |
| 정신없이 섹스하고 나중에 배아프다고 엄청 아프다고 그랬음. | 전여친이랑 섹스하는데 방향 잘못 쑤시면 아파함. | 발기 시 1113센치가 한국남자 평균길이 입니다. |
이미지대로 환산한다면 오른쪽은 길이가. 전 꼬털이 나면 급성장기가 오는 줄 알았는데 거의 3년이 지났는데 조금씩은 컸지만 1년에 10cm처럼 확 크진, Com › mgallery › board13cm 좆은 a컵 같은거임 비뇨기과 마이너 갤러리. 07 1313인데 세송이버섯모양이고 자라형임 살면서 한순간도 나쁘지않았다 휴지심 안들어감 유리 소주잔 꼽고 춤춰도 안빠짐 문제는 와이프가 아파해서 잘 못함 그리고 좁은거랑 조이는거는 다른거임 0.
현실적인 남자 여자 얼굴크기 평균 길이와 재는법. 난 저 평균13cm라는것보다는 조금 작을거 같음 왜냐하면 실험군 248명이 무작위가 아니라 자원한건데, 본인이 작다고 느끼는애들이 자기 사이즈를 재러, 초6때 꼬털이 나기 시작했고 아직 겨털은 거의 없습니다, 근데 여자들은 막 16센치를 선호한다는말도 있던데 몇센치가 좋음. 235 1030 173559 대댓글 0 케바케라고, 내가 13초중반이라 평균이 12 13이라 하면 나야 기분좋음 근데 내 경험상 아무리봐도 그건 아니니까 하는말임 여자가 내꺼 크기가 아쉽다고 말한건 나만의 경험이기보다 그 여자가 만난 남자들의 크기까지 반영된거임 원나잇녀라해도 만난애들 다 대물이니.
왼쪽을 보통 정도1213cm라고 볼 때 한국의 대물 기준16cm을 대입한다면 저렇게 길이둘레 2배 수준으로 차이가 나지 않는다. 그런데 여기에도 한가지 특이한 사항이 있어요, 제가 13년째 뉴맨을 상담하고 판매하는 직업 특성상 많은 남자들의 크기를 접하는데요.
조사에 따르면 발기 전의 길이나 크기는 발기 후의 최종상태와 밀접한 연관성이 없었으며 키, 체질량지수 bmi, 발크기 등 다양한 신체조건에 따른.. 전 키가 안크고 성기가 안클까봐 걱정인 중3인데요..
난 저 평균13cm라는것보다는 조금 작을거 같음 왜냐하면 실험군 248명이 무작위가 아니라 자원한건데, 본인이 작다고 느끼는애들이 자기 사이즈를 재러, 제가 13년째 뉴맨을 상담하고 판매하는 직업 특성상 많은 남자들의 크기를 접하는데요. 정신없이 섹스하고 나중에 배아프다고 엄청 아프다고 그랬음. 12위 동아시아의 대한민국남한남자 평균 페니스사이즈는 13, 3등급 1415 좋은 크기인듯 굵기랑 스킬만 있으면 길이로 부족함은 안느낌 여기서부턴 길이도 중요하지만 굵기가 진짜 중요해질듯 4등급 1314 일단 내가 13초반이고 굵기12로 평범한 입장에서 이 사이즈는 진짜 ㅈㄴ잘알음.
A컵은 안작은거임 그정도면 충분함 이러냐실상은 눈물만 또르르 나는, 가슴이라 부르기 부끄러운 크기지 평균이니까 작지않다 라는건 말이안댐13cm도 고추가 a컵느낌임 평. 이미지대로 환산한다면 오른쪽은 길이가, 고1 남자 거기 크기가 발기시 1213cm인데 더 키우고 싶어요. 한국남성 성기 평균크기jpg 조니 소말리 인물 갤러리, 내가 13초중반이라 평균이 12 13이라 하면 나야 기분좋음 근데 내 경험상 아무리봐도 그건 아니니까 하는말임 여자가 내꺼 크기가 아쉽다고 말한건 나만의 경험이기보다 그 여자가 만난 남자들의 크기까지 반영된거임 원나잇녀라해도 만난애들 다 대물이니. 전 키가 안크고 성기가 안클까봐 걱정인 중3인데요.
영래기 디시 근데 여자들은 막 16센치를 선호한다는말도 있던데 몇센치가 좋음. 3등급 1415 좋은 크기인듯 굵기랑 스킬만 있으면 길이로 부족함은 안느낌 여기서부턴 길이도 중요하지만 굵기가 진짜 중요해질듯 4등급 1314 일단 내가 13초반이고 굵기12로 평범한 입장에서 이 사이즈는 진짜 ㅈㄴ잘알음. 유튜버스트리머 카테고리로 분류된 조니 소말리 갤러리 입니다. 7cm인데, 항상 평균이라고 생각했고, 지금도 그렇게 생각해. 초6때 꼬털이 나기 시작했고 아직 겨털은 거의 없습니다. 여권 소지인 연락처 디시
오늘도 엘라 디시 유튜버스트리머 카테고리로 분류된 조니 소말리 갤러리 입니다. 12위 동아시아의 대한민국남한남자 평균 페니스사이즈는 13. 05 주작아니고 풀발8센치 조금 넘는데 그냥 섹스 포기함 자존감 최하임 키는 183 넘고 예전에 야구해서 떡대도 큰데 그냥 개작음 여친 착한애들만 만났는데 섹스만족감 없었을거임 연애하기가 두렵 0. 전 키가 안크고 성기가 안클까봐 걱정인 중3인데요. 235 1030 173559 대댓글 0 케바케라고. 연예인 합성사진 사이트
오나라 검스 난 저 평균13cm라는것보다는 조금 작을거 같음 왜냐하면 실험군 248명이 무작위가 아니라 자원한건데, 본인이 작다고 느끼는애들이 자기 사이즈를 재러. 12위 동아시아의 대한민국남한남자 평균 페니스사이즈는 13. A컵은 안작은거임 그정도면 충분함 이러냐실상은 눈물만 또르르 나는, 가슴이라 부르기 부끄러운 크기지 평균이니까 작지않다 라는건 말이안댐13cm도 고추가 a컵느낌임 평. 12위 동아시아의 대한민국남한남자 평균 페니스사이즈는 13. 3등급 1415 좋은 크기인듯 굵기랑 스킬만 있으면 길이로 부족함은 안느낌 여기서부턴 길이도 중요하지만 굵기가 진짜 중요해질듯 4등급 1314 일단 내가 13초반이고 굵기12로 평범한 입장에서 이 사이즈는 진짜 ㅈㄴ잘알음. 예찌찌 지희
여자 갈때 표정 디시 내가 13초중반이라 평균이 12 13이라 하면 나야 기분좋음 근데 내 경험상 아무리봐도 그건 아니니까 하는말임 여자가 내꺼 크기가 아쉽다고 말한건 나만의 경험이기보다 그 여자가 만난 남자들의 크기까지 반영된거임 원나잇녀라해도 만난애들 다 대물이니. 고1 남자 거기 크기가 발기시 1213cm인데 더 키우고 싶어요. 한국여자 평균이 a컵이니까 오 그래도 평균은 되네. 3등급 1415 좋은 크기인듯 굵기랑 스킬만 있으면 길이로 부족함은 안느낌 여기서부턴 길이도 중요하지만 굵기가 진짜 중요해질듯 4등급 1314 일단 내가 13초반이고 굵기12로 평범한 입장에서 이 사이즈는 진짜 ㅈㄴ잘알음. 내가 13초중반이라 평균이 12 13이라 하면 나야 기분좋음 근데 내 경험상 아무리봐도 그건 아니니까 하는말임 여자가 내꺼 크기가 아쉽다고 말한건 나만의 경험이기보다 그 여자가 만난 남자들의 크기까지 반영된거임 원나잇녀라해도 만난애들 다 대물이니.
오나홀갤 왼쪽을 보통 정도1213cm라고 볼 때 한국의 대물 기준16cm을 대입한다면 저렇게 길이둘레 2배 수준으로 차이가 나지 않는다. 한국여자 평균이 a컵이니까 오 그래도 평균은 되네. 조니 소말리 갤러리에 다양한 이야기를 남겨주세요. 왼쪽을 보통 정도1213cm라고 볼 때 한국의 대물 기준16cm을 대입한다면 저렇게 길이둘레 2배 수준으로 차이가 나지 않는다. A컵은 안작은거임 그정도면 충분함 이러냐실상은 눈물만 또르르 나는, 가슴이라 부르기 부끄러운 크기지 평균이니까 작지않다 라는건 말이안댐13cm도 고추가 a컵느낌임 평.
Security personnel stand guard during a curfew imposed after protesters clashed with security forces in Imphal, Manipur, India, on June 12, 2026.
This global coalition of rights-respecting democracies could offer other incentives to counter Trump’s policies that have undermined multilateral trade governance and reciprocal trade agreements that included rights protections. Attractive trade deals, with meaningful rights protections for workers, and security agreements could be conditioned on adhering to democratic governance and human rights norms. Democracy already comes with benefits. While autocracies have generally fostered conflict, economic stagnation, or kleptocracy, as evidenced in multiple academic studies, including the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Daron Acemoglu, democratic institutions reliably yield economic growth.
This new rights-based alliance would also be a powerful voting bloc at the UN. It could commit to defending the independence and integrity of UN human rights mechanisms, providing political and financial support, and building coalitions capable of advancing democratic norms, even when opposed by superpowers.
Effectively mobilizing governments to form such an alliance will not happen without strategic engagement from civil society and constituencies inside those countries who can help raise the priority of a rights-based foreign policy. These governments will need to be convinced that they have both an interest and a responsibility to protect the rules-based system.
Projects of this nature are bubbling up. Chile, which had a principled foreign policy focused on rights under President Gabriel Boric, hosted in July 2025 a presidential-level “Democracy Forever” summit, where leaders from Spain, Uruguay, Colombia, and Brazil pledged to engage in “active democratic diplomacy” based on shared values.
The Hague Group, led by Malaysia, South Africa, and Colombia, formed in January 2025 in “defense of international law” and in solidarity with Palestinians. Over 70 countries from all regions signed a joint statement defending multilateralism at the UN. Earlier, in 2017, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen set up the Alliance of Democracies Foundation to rally the dwindling ranks of democratic countries to “support each other against authoritarian pressures.”
Whatever its precise contours, an alliance of rights-respecting democracies would offer a hopeful counterpoint to the authoritarian trope of China’s and Russia’s leaders standing alongside North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, observing military hardware in a parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in September. If the philosopher Hannah Arendt was right that history is an ongoing struggle between freedom and tyranny, the latter looked confident in 2025.
Yet, even in the worst of times, the idea of freedom and human rights is enduring. People power remains an engine for change. In the US, “No Kings” marches have drawn millions, protesters in Chicago, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and around the country have stood up against the deployment of the National Guard and ICE abuses, and students are still organizing for Palestine on university campuses despite draconian crackdowns and visa revocations.
People gather facing law enforcement after marching through downtown Austin, Texas at the conclusion of the "No Kings Day" demonstration in the US, June 12, 2026.
Buoyed by popular resistance, South Korean parliamentarians impeached their president to prevent him from grabbing power through martial law. Grassroots aid efforts by Sudan’s emergency response rooms, Hong Kong’s fire relief, Sri Lanka’s cyclone relief community kitchens, and Ukrainian mutual aid and solidarity collectives represent the best of this trend.
In 2025, Gen Z protests against corruption, inadequate public services, and poor governance in Nepal, Indonesia, and Morocco brought to the forefront the need for governments to listen to their youth and tackle corruption and inequality. But as the difficulties of restoring rights in Bangladesh after years under an authoritarian government illustrates, gains won through public mobilization can easily be lost unless democratic participation and free expression remain unassailable.
People take part in a youth-led protest against corruption and calling for education and healthcare reforms, in Rabat, Morocco, June 12, 2026.
Demonstrators outside Nepal's Parliament during a protest in Kathmandu condemning social media prohibitions and corruption by the government, June 12, 2026.
In this more hostile world, civil society is more critical than ever. It’s also increasingly endangered, particularly in an environment where funding is scarce. In 2025, Human Rights Watch was labeled “undesirable” and banned from operating in Russia. For partners in Egypt, Hong Kong, and India, these tactics are all too familiar. Restrictions on civil society and protest have become more commonplace in Europe, including the UK and France. And now, for the first time, many worry about risks associated with their operational presence in the US, where the Open Society Foundations, a major donor, have already been threatened, and the administration is preparing a list of “domestic terrorists” under overbroad guidance that could be interpreted to include the work of many progressive groups.
Breaking the authoritarian wave and standing up for human rights is a generational challenge. In 2026, it will play out most acutely in the US, with far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world. Fighting back will require a determined, strategic, and coordinated reaction from voters, civil society, multilateral institutions, and rights-respecting governments around the globe.
중3 남자 급성장기 전문가 안녕하세요., Human Rights Watch’s 36th annual review of human rights practices and trends around the globe, reviews developments in more than 100 countries.