US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, June 11, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, June 11, 2026.
The global human rights system is in peril. Under relentless pressure from US President Donald Trump, and persistently undermined by China and Russia, the rules-based international order is being crushed, threatening to take with it the architecture human rights defenders have come to rely on to advance norms and protect freedoms. To defy this trend, governments that still value human rights, alongside social movements, civil society, and international institutions, need to form a strategic alliance to push back.
To be fair, the downward spiral predated Trump’s reelection. The democratic wave that began over 50 years ago has given way to what scholars term a “democratic recession.” Democracy is now back to 1985 levels according to some metrics, with 72 percent of the world’s population now living under autocracy. Russia and China are less free today than 20 years ago. And so is the United States.
Of course, democracy is not a panacea for human rights violations; the US and other longtime democracies have their own histories of colonial crimes, racism, abusive justice systems, and wartime atrocities. More recently, authoritarian leaders have exploited public mistrust and anger to win elections and then dismantled the very institutions that brought them to power. Democratic institutions are crucial to represent the will of the people and keep power in check. It’s no surprise that whenever democracy is undermined, rights are too, as evident in recent years in India, Türkiye, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Hungary.
FIRST: The Momentum Movement’s parliamentary representative David Bedo and independent member of parliament Akos Hadhazy protest against a law that bans Pride marches in Hungary and imposes fines on organizers and attendees of such events, Budapest, June 11, 2026. © 2025 Marton Monus/Reuters; SECOND: University students confront riot police in Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, June 11, 2026. © 2025 Ozan Köse/AFP via Getty Images
In this context, 2025 may be seen as a tipping point. In just 12 months, the Trump administration has carried out a broad assault on key pillars of US democracy and the global rules-based order, which the US, despite inconsistencies, was, with other states, instrumental in helping to establish.
In short order, Trump’s second-term administration has undermined trust in the sanctity of elections, reduced government accountability, gutted food assistance and healthcare subsidies, attacked judicial independence, defied court orders, rolled back women’s rights, obstructed access to abortion care, undermined remedies for racial harm, terminated programs mandating accessibility for people with disabilities, punished free speech, stripped protections from trans and intersex people, eroded privacy, and used government power to intimidate political opponents, the media, law firms, universities, civil society, and even comedians.
Claiming a risk of “civilizational erasure” in Europe and leaning on racist tropes to cast entire populations as unwelcome in the US, the Trump administration has embraced policies and rhetoric that align with white nationalist ideology. Immigrants and asylum seekers have been subjected to inhumane conditions and degrading treatment; 32 died in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody in 2025, and as of mid-January 2026, an additional 4 have died. Masked immigration enforcement agents have targeted people of color, using excessive force, terrorizing communities, wrongfully arresting scores of citizens, and, most recently, unjustifiably killing two people in Minneapolis, whose deaths Human Rights Watch has documented.
The US president of course has the authority to tighten US borders and enforce stricter immigration policies. The administration is not, however, entitled to deny legal process to asylum seekers, mistreat undocumented migrants, or unlawfully discriminate. In a well-functioning democracy, no electoral mandate should supersede domestic legislation, constitutional protections, or international human rights law. Trump’s team has repeatedly bypassed these guardrails.
The violations have not stopped at the border. The Trump administration used a 1798 law to send hundreds of Venezuelan migrants to an infamous prison in El Salvador, where they were tortured and sexually abused. Its blatantly unlawful strikes on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific extrajudicially killed more than 120 people whom Trump claims were drug traffickers.
US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, June 11, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, June 11, 2026.
After the US attacked Venezuela and apprehended its president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump claimed the US would “run” the country and control its vast oil reserves. Despite paying lip service to human rights concerns under Maduro at the United Nations, Trump has worked with the same repressive apparatus to further US interests. Many Western allies have chosen to stay silent about these lawless moves, perhaps fearing erratic tariffs and blowback to their alliances.
Trump’s foreign policy has upended the foundations of the rules-based order that seeks to advance democracy and human rights, even if imperfectly.
Trump has boasted that he doesn’t “need international law” as a constraint, only his “own morality.” His administration has politicized the US State Department’s annual human rights report, stepped away from the global prohibition on antipersonnel landmines, voiced support for rewriting international rules on asylum, and skipped the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of the US’ human rights record.
His administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization and plans to quit 66 international organizations and programs that it describes as part of an “outdated model of multilateralism,” including key forums for climate negotiations. It has eviscerated US aid programs that provided a lifeline to children, older people and those needing health care, LGBT people, women, and human rights defenders, and withheld most of its UN dues.
Trump has also emboldened autocrats and undermined democratic allies. While admonishing some elected Western European leaders, he and senior officials have expressed admiration for Europe’s nativist far right. He has favored autocrats such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, while continuing decades of US support to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
His administration has unjustifiably imposed sanctions to punish respected Palestinian human rights organizations, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor and many of its judges, a UN special rapporteur, and for several months, a Brazilian Supreme Court judge and his wife.
The institutional response in the US to Trump’s power grabs has been shockingly muted. Much of Congress, controlled by his own party, has not challenged his supercharged expansion of executive power. The leaders of the US’ most powerful technology companies have made significant donations and sought to placate the president. Some big law firms and prestigious universities have made deals rather than assert their independence, and some media organizations seem afraid to attract the president’s ire.
Has the US switched sides on the human rights playing field? While US engagement with human rights institutions has always been selective, China and Russia have long pursued an illiberal agenda. They stand much to gain from a US government that now expresses open hostility to universal rights. China and Russia remain strategic rivals of the US, but all three countries are now led by leaders who share open disdain for norms and institutions that could constrain their power.
Police detain an activist outside the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, before lawmakers approved a bill that punishes online searches for information that is deemed “extremist,” in Moscow, June 11, 2026.
Together, they wield considerable economic, military, and diplomatic power. If they were to consistently act as allies of convenience to erode global rules, they could threaten the entire system. Already, a loose international network of countries such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar, Cuba, and Belarus work in concert with Russia and China. These leaders share very little ideologically but align in undermining human rights and promoting a regressive international agenda. In word and in practice, the US government is now helping them in this endeavor.
FIRST: Surveillance cameras installed in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, June 11, 2026. © 2025 Kyodo News via Getty Images; SECOND: A television in a restaurant in Hong Kong shows a missile being launched during military exercises being held by China around the island of Taiwan, June 11, 2026. © 2022 Isaac Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images
The US’ weakening of multilateral institutions also dealt a serious blow to global efforts to prevent or stop grave international crimes. The “never again” movement, born from the horrors of the Holocaust and reignited by the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, spurred the UN General Assembly to embrace the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. Meant to guide international intervention to prevent and stop atrocities in tandem with efforts to prosecute and punish serious crimes, R2P made a real difference in places like the Central African Republic and Kenya.
Today, R2P is rarely invoked and the ICC is under siege. In addition to Trump’s far-reaching sanctions, in December 2025 a Moscow court sentenced the ICC prosecutor and eight of its judges to prison terms in absentia. Moreover, despite being ICC fugitives, in 2025, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was welcomed by Donald Trump in Alaska, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Hungary, an ICC member state at the time, at Orban’s invitation.
Twenty years ago, the US government and civil society were instrumental in galvanizing a response to mass atrocities in Darfur. Sudan is burning again, but this time under Trump, with relative impunity. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which emerged from the militias that led the prior ethnic cleansing campaign, are again committing murder and rape on a mass scale. A growing body of evidence indicates that the UAE, a longtime US ally that recently made multi-billion-dollar deals with Trump, is providing the RSF with military support.
A former bus station turned into internally displaced person settlement in Gedaref, Sudan, June 11, 2026.
In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israeli armed forces have committed acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, killing over 70,000 people since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and displacing the vast majority of Gaza’s population. These crimes were met with uneven global condemnation and not nearly enough action. Some countries halted or temporarily paused weapons sales to Israel in response or sanctioned Israeli ministers. Trump, however, continued a long-standing US policy of almost unconditional support to Israel, even as the International Court of Justice is weighing allegations of genocide and has issued binding orders under the Genocide Convention to protect Palestinians’ rights.
Trump announced in February an alarming US plan to transform Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East” free of Palestinians, which would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing. As implementation of the 20-point Trump peace plan has stalled, the administration has further normalized the dispossession of Palestinians through its failure to publicly protest Israel’s regular killing of those approaching the “yellow line” that now divides Gaza, its ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes, and unlawful restrictions on humanitarian aid.
FIRST: A Palestinian girl stands amidst rubble in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, June 11, 2026. © 2025 Bashar Taleb/AFP via Getty Images; SECOND: Palestinians inspect a house demolished by Israeli military forces in the town of Qabatiya in the Israeli occupied West Bank, June 11, 2026. © 2025 Nasser Ishtayeh/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
In Ukraine, Trump’s peace efforts have consistently downplayed Russia’s responsibility for serious violations. These include indiscriminate bombing, coercing Ukrainians in occupied areas to serve in the Russian military, systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war, the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the use of quadcopter drones to hunt and kill civilians. Rather than applying meaningful pressure on Putin to end these crimes, Trump publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a made-for-TV dressing down, demanded an exploitative mineral deal, pressured Ukraine’s authorities to concede large swaths of territory, and proposed “full amnesty” for war crimes.
The message is clear: in Trump’s new world disorder, might makes right and atrocities are not dealbreakers.
A man stands in the courtyard of his house following a Russian strike on the outskirts of Odesa, Ukraine, June 11, 2026.
Jp › 510650「jc」はなんの略?一定の若者のことを総称した言葉!略語クイズ. Jp › content › jc「jc ジェイシー・ジェーシー」の意味や使い方 わかりやすく解説 we. 7割が法律に沿った使い方 中高生に「学生」は少数派. 実際に、jc活動が原因で経営が傾き、最終的に倒産した事例もあると聞いていますので、事業に支障のない範囲で、断る勇気を持つことも大事です。 参加意欲がないと得られるものがない jcでの活動は地域活動を中心となっています。.
| ・ljkはlast jkラスト ジェーケーで高校3年生。 ・jcは女子中学生。 っていうのは知ってるんですけど、小学生ってこういう言い方でなんていうんですか?. | jcの意味jcとは女子中学生を意味する言葉で、読み方は「ジェーシー」です。女子中学生の1年生を表す時は「jc1」、2年生は「jc2」、3年生は「jc3」のようにそれぞれ表記されます。jcの語源・由来jcは、「女子中学生」のローマ字表記 joshi chugak. | あなたが普段、日常で使っている言葉はもしかして略語かも!?このクイズで正式名称を覚えよう。 「女子中学生」の略語は? 「女子中学生. | Jp › content › 青年会議所「青年会議所」の意味や使い方 わかりやすく解説 weblio辞書. |
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| 経営者ではないのですが入れますか? 経営者の集まりではございません。 あくまで地域を良くしたい20歳から40歳までの青年の集まりです。 普通の会社員もいますし、他の青年会議所には学生もいると聞いたことがあり. | Jp › life › wordsjk、jc とは?略称の意味 memorva メモルヴァ. | Jcの意味とは?|クイズキャッスル百科事典|quiz castle. | 28% |
| Js 女子小学生 jc 女子中学生 jk 女子高生 jd 女子大学生※ネット上での略語なので、普通の会話や仕事では使いません。. | 伝わっているようで伝わらない jcの会員拡大の意義とは?. | 伝わっているようで伝わらない jcの会員拡大の意義とは?. | 72% |
Js 女子小学生 jc 女子中学生 jk 女子高生 jd 女子大学生※ネット上での略語なので、普通の会話や仕事では使いません。. 読み方:ジェイシーワン 「jc1」とは女子中学1年生を意味する隠語である。 最近の若者の間では女子中学生のことをjcと呼ぶ傾向にあり それの1年生であることからjc1と呼ぶ。 同様に女子中学2年生をjc2 女子中学生3年生をjc3と呼ぶ。 元々は, Jcとはjunior chamber (青年会議所)の略です。 jcは『明るい豊かな社会』を実現することを目的とし活動しています。 「jc」はどんな団体? jcは、世界110以上の. Jcとはjunior chamber (青年会議所)の略です。 jcは『明るい豊かな社会』を実現することを目的とし活動しています。 「jc」はどんな団体? jcは、世界110以上の. 「jc」ってな~に? nantanjc jimdoページ.
Jkは女子高生。てか、 jd jc は意味ですか の定義 jcは女子中学生。 女子小学生はjsです。女子大学生 jd 女子小学生 jcjkは女子高生jyoshikose dkは男子高生dannshikose.. Jkは女子高生。てか、 jd jc は意味ですか の定義 jcは女子中学生。 女子小学生はjsです。女子大学生 jd 女子小学生 jcjkは女子高生jyoshikose dkは男子高生dannshikose.. 女子高生をjkと略す要領で女子中学生は jc(じぇーしー、じぇいしー)、女子小学生はjs、女子大生はjdと略すことがある。 それぞれローマ字で書いたときの read more..
青年会議所 jcは、明るい豊かな社会の実現を同じ理想とし、次代の担い手たる責任感をもった20歳から40歳までの指導者たらんとする青年の団体です。 1949年、明るい豊かな社会の実現を理想とし、責任感と情熱をもった青年有志による東京青年商工会議所 商工会議所法制定にともない. 「学生」と呼べるのはどれぐらいの範囲でしょうか? 大学生や専門学校生 69. 歴史 日本 で近代教育が行われるようになった当初は全てを「生徒」と称して区別がなかったが、諸外国で 大学 とそれ以下の学校で学ぶ者の名称が異なることから、 1881年 8月2日 に 東京大学 の 本科 生を「学生」と呼ぶことが定められた 1。.
kpop deepfake pmv all とはどういう意味ですか? 日本語に関する. とはどういう意味ですか? 日本語に関する. 「じぇーけー」、「じぇいけー」などと読む。 女子高生をjkと略す要領で女子中学生は jc (じぇーしー、じぇいしー)、女子小学生はjs、女子大生はjdと略すことがある。 それぞれローマ字で書いたときの頭文字からきている。. 実際に、jc活動が原因で経営が傾き、最終的に倒産した事例もあると聞いていますので、事業に支障のない範囲で、断る勇気を持つことも大事です。 参加意欲がないと得られるものがない jcでの活動は地域活動を中心となっています。. Jp › life › wordsjk、jc とは?略称の意味 memorva メモルヴァ. kpop ai19
le sserafim deepfakes porn Jp › posts › 1450「jc」とは?意味や使い方・関連用語を徹底解説 言葉の意味辞典. Com › internet › jc「jc」とは?意味と例文が3秒でわかる! コトワカkotowaka. なお、jcは、上記以外にも、「junior chamber(青年会議所)」や「japan cup(ジャパンカップ)」、「japan consortium(ジャパンコンソーシアム)」、「japan current(日本海流)」などの略語としても使われます。. 女子中学生の略。 「女子中学生」をローマ字化して頭文字を取った語。 似たような語にはjd(女子大生)、jk(女子高生)などがある。. 「jc」は「女子中学生」を意味するネットスラングで、ローマ字表記の「joshi chuugakusei」の頭文字を取った略語です。 読み方はそのまま「ジェイシー」で、主にインターネット上のコミュニケーションで使用されます。. kuzu_v0 15
kuzu 인플루언서 Jp › 510650「jc」はなんの略?一定の若者のことを総称した言葉!略語クイズ. の定義 js 女子小学生 jc 女子中学生 jk 女子高生 jd 女子大学生 ※ネット上での略語なので、普通の会話や仕事では使いません。 女子小学生 女子高生 女子大生 女子中学生. Days ago 日本共産党の平野貞雄衆院兵庫7区候補と久保田けんじ県議、青年学生後援会は26日、西宮市の関西学院大学前で学生らにシールアンケートを使っ. jc 青年会議所について質問です。 「地域によってさまざま」や「入会して自身で判断すればいい」など回答以外で、現在所属されているメンバーの方からの実態 金銭面・時間・自社業務への影響等を回答お願いします。. Jc jcは、「女子中学生(joshi chugakusei)」の頭文字を取った若者言葉(アルファベット略語)をいいます。これは、2007年に世間的な流行語にもなった「ky(空気読めない)」. lenbarboza kemono party
lexi marvel onlyfans twitter 1950年(昭和25年)5月1日に行動綱領として「個人の修練(トレーニング)、社会への奉仕(サービス)、世界との友情(フレンドシップ)」の三信条を採択した。日本青年会議所(以下jc)の理念はこの三信条を基本姿勢に置き、三つの信条の下でボランティアや行政改革等に取り組む 1。 1960. 入会して直後、一ヶ月経過後、4年目と折りに触れて「jcって何? 」という記事を書いていました。 6年を経て卒業するので、改めて自分にとってのjcとはどういうものだったのか、整理してみたいと思います。. 読み方:ジェイシーワン 「jc1」とは女子中学1年生を意味する隠語である。 最近の若者の間では女子中学生のことをjcと呼ぶ傾向にあり それの1年生であることからjc1と呼ぶ。 同様に女子中学2年生をjc2 女子中学生3年生をjc3と呼ぶ。 元々は. Days ago 日本共産党の平野貞雄衆院兵庫7区候補と久保田けんじ県議、青年学生後援会は26日、西宮市の関西学院大学前で学生らにシールアンケートを使っ. 2025年の学生たちが日常で使う「学生語」を知っていますか? jk(女子高生)やjd(女子大生)の間では、snsや学校、アルバイトの場面で次々と新しい言葉が生まれています。略語や流行語は、彼女たちの価値観や人間関係の縮図ともいえるもの。 こ.
leakedmodels Jp › content › 青年会議所「青年会議所」の意味や使い方 わかりやすく解説 weblio辞書. 果たして、正解は? 正解は「女子中学生」 を略した言葉でした! jcとは、女子中学生をローマ字にして頭文字を取った言葉です。 また、女子小学生は「js」、女子大学生は「jd」と略すそうですよ! あなたはわかりましたか?. 青年会議所 出典 フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア(wikipedia)』 20180429 1938 utc 版 青年会議所 (せいねんかいぎしょ、 英 junior chamber)は、世界各国に存在する18~40歳のリーダーシップ研鑽を目的とした npo ngo。. Jcとは中学生のことですか? yahoo. 1950年(昭和25年)5月1日に行動綱領として「個人の修練(トレーニング)、社会への奉仕(サービス)、世界との友情(フレンドシップ)」の三信条を採択した。日本青年会議所(以下jc)の理念はこの三信条を基本姿勢に置き、三つの信条の下でボランティアや行政改革等に取り組む 1。 1960.
Security personnel stand guard during a curfew imposed after protesters clashed with security forces in Imphal, Manipur, India, on June 11, 2026.
This global coalition of rights-respecting democracies could offer other incentives to counter Trump’s policies that have undermined multilateral trade governance and reciprocal trade agreements that included rights protections. Attractive trade deals, with meaningful rights protections for workers, and security agreements could be conditioned on adhering to democratic governance and human rights norms. Democracy already comes with benefits. While autocracies have generally fostered conflict, economic stagnation, or kleptocracy, as evidenced in multiple academic studies, including the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Daron Acemoglu, democratic institutions reliably yield economic growth.
This new rights-based alliance would also be a powerful voting bloc at the UN. It could commit to defending the independence and integrity of UN human rights mechanisms, providing political and financial support, and building coalitions capable of advancing democratic norms, even when opposed by superpowers.
Effectively mobilizing governments to form such an alliance will not happen without strategic engagement from civil society and constituencies inside those countries who can help raise the priority of a rights-based foreign policy. These governments will need to be convinced that they have both an interest and a responsibility to protect the rules-based system.
Projects of this nature are bubbling up. Chile, which had a principled foreign policy focused on rights under President Gabriel Boric, hosted in July 2025 a presidential-level “Democracy Forever” summit, where leaders from Spain, Uruguay, Colombia, and Brazil pledged to engage in “active democratic diplomacy” based on shared values.
The Hague Group, led by Malaysia, South Africa, and Colombia, formed in January 2025 in “defense of international law” and in solidarity with Palestinians. Over 70 countries from all regions signed a joint statement defending multilateralism at the UN. Earlier, in 2017, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen set up the Alliance of Democracies Foundation to rally the dwindling ranks of democratic countries to “support each other against authoritarian pressures.”
Whatever its precise contours, an alliance of rights-respecting democracies would offer a hopeful counterpoint to the authoritarian trope of China’s and Russia’s leaders standing alongside North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, observing military hardware in a parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in September. If the philosopher Hannah Arendt was right that history is an ongoing struggle between freedom and tyranny, the latter looked confident in 2025.
Yet, even in the worst of times, the idea of freedom and human rights is enduring. People power remains an engine for change. In the US, “No Kings” marches have drawn millions, protesters in Chicago, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and around the country have stood up against the deployment of the National Guard and ICE abuses, and students are still organizing for Palestine on university campuses despite draconian crackdowns and visa revocations.
People gather facing law enforcement after marching through downtown Austin, Texas at the conclusion of the "No Kings Day" demonstration in the US, June 11, 2026.
Buoyed by popular resistance, South Korean parliamentarians impeached their president to prevent him from grabbing power through martial law. Grassroots aid efforts by Sudan’s emergency response rooms, Hong Kong’s fire relief, Sri Lanka’s cyclone relief community kitchens, and Ukrainian mutual aid and solidarity collectives represent the best of this trend.
In 2025, Gen Z protests against corruption, inadequate public services, and poor governance in Nepal, Indonesia, and Morocco brought to the forefront the need for governments to listen to their youth and tackle corruption and inequality. But as the difficulties of restoring rights in Bangladesh after years under an authoritarian government illustrates, gains won through public mobilization can easily be lost unless democratic participation and free expression remain unassailable.
People take part in a youth-led protest against corruption and calling for education and healthcare reforms, in Rabat, Morocco, June 11, 2026.
Demonstrators outside Nepal's Parliament during a protest in Kathmandu condemning social media prohibitions and corruption by the government, June 11, 2026.
In this more hostile world, civil society is more critical than ever. It’s also increasingly endangered, particularly in an environment where funding is scarce. In 2025, Human Rights Watch was labeled “undesirable” and banned from operating in Russia. For partners in Egypt, Hong Kong, and India, these tactics are all too familiar. Restrictions on civil society and protest have become more commonplace in Europe, including the UK and France. And now, for the first time, many worry about risks associated with their operational presence in the US, where the Open Society Foundations, a major donor, have already been threatened, and the administration is preparing a list of “domestic terrorists” under overbroad guidance that could be interpreted to include the work of many progressive groups.
Breaking the authoritarian wave and standing up for human rights is a generational challenge. In 2026, it will play out most acutely in the US, with far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world. Fighting back will require a determined, strategic, and coordinated reaction from voters, civil society, multilateral institutions, and rights-respecting governments around the globe.
の定義 js 女子小学生 jc 女子中学生 jk 女子高生 jd 女子大学生 ※ネット上での略語なので、普通の会話や仕事では使いません。 女子小学生 女子高生 女子大生 女子中学生., Human Rights Watch’s 36th annual review of human rights practices and trends around the globe, reviews developments in more than 100 countries.